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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2580 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SADIEL GONZALEZ, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(Crim. Action No. 09-cr-709) 
District Judge: Honorable Katharine S. Hayden 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 7, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 31, 2012) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Sadiel Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) appeals the sentence imposed by the 
District Court following a guilty plea for possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or 
more of heroin.  Gonzalez argues that the District Court erred by not granting his motion 
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seeking a downward variance from the applicable career offender range called for by the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court‟s 
sentence. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
On October 18, 2010, Gonzalez pled guilty to one count of distributing and 
possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a).  Based on the circumstances of Gonzalez‟s crime and his status as a career 
offender, the Sentencing Guidelines suggested a range of 188 to 235 months of 
imprisonment.  Gonzalez did not contest his designation as a career offender.  Instead, 
Gonzalez requested that the District Court grant a downward variance from the career 
offender sentencing range. 
On June 1, 2011, Gonzalez appeared before the District Court for sentencing.  The 
District Court declined Gonzalez‟s request for a downward variance but sentenced 
Gonzalez to 188 months in prison—the bottom end of the career offender range.  
Gonzalez filed a timely appeal of his sentence. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
Gonzalez conceded that his criminal history placed him within the ambit of career 
offender status and that, as a result of this designation and the nature of his crime, the 
Sentencing Guidelines recommended a range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment.  
The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court‟s sentence was rendered 
substantively unreasonable when the District Court denied Gonzalez‟s motion for a 
downward variance.  We conclude that the District Court properly exercised its discretion 
in denying Gonzalez‟s motion. 
An inquiry into the substantive reasonableness of a sentence asks “whether the 
final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised 
upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] 
factors.”  United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States 
v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)).  “Absent procedural error, we will 
affirm the sentencing court „unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 
provided.‟”  Id. (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568).  The party challenging the sentence 
bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 
Applying this standard, we discern no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.  
The sentencing colloquy evidences that the District Court was thorough in its 
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.  During the sentencing colloquy, the District Court 
took note of Gonzalez‟s lengthy criminal history: 
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[H]e‟s kind of like a walking crime zone when he‟s in the 
neighborhoods that he‟s in . . . . He has a significant 
record. . . . So it‟s never really peaceful around Mr. Gonzalez 
when he‟s on the street. 
  
. . . . 
 
Mr. Gonzalez is not one of these Sad Sack‟s that very often 
the Court has before it, who is so low level and so muddled in 
his life that heavy street crimes are all of the kind the offender 
knows. 
 
. . . . 
  
 Mr. Gonzalez is far more high functioning as a human 
being, as a drug seller, and as a criminal unfortunately.  
 
(App. 48.)  The District Court found that it could not “in good conscience, given the 
responsibilities of sentencing[,] say that Mr. Gonzalez warrants a variance from the 
harshness of a career offender status designation.”  (App. 49.)  The District Court 
concluded that the bottom end of the sentencing range “is sufficient but not more than 
necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing, which is just punishment for a life spent 
committing crime after crime after crime, selling drugs, serious drugs and profiting from 
it.”  (App. 49.) 
We find no merit to Gonzalez‟s argument that the District Court failed to give 
sufficient weight to certain mitigating factors in the § 3553(a) analysis—Gonzalez‟s 
learning disability, traumatic relocation to America from Cuba at a young age, medical 
ailments resulting from being shot, and the violent death of his uncle—warranting a 
downward variance.  To the contrary, the District Court acknowledged Gonzalez‟s 
troubled past and was candid about the difficulties he has faced obtaining gainful 
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employment given his extensive criminal history.  But the District Court noted that 
Gonzalez was not merely a victim of circumstances beyond his control.  Specifically, as 
the District Court determined, Gonzalez made a conscious decision to engage in “a life of 
persistent criminality on a fairly regular basis in spite of regular visits to state prisons and 
federal prison.”  (App. 48.) 
Because the District Court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a downward variance from the 
career offender range. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s sentence. 
